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Economic effects of
integration policies 
of migrants
This article sketches the economic effects of the Welcome
Programme proposed by the Secretariat of Migration of the
Department of Social Action and Citizenship of the Government of
Catalonia. Social benefits expected from implementing the
programme are assessed, the aim of which is to facilitate acquisition
of skills and necessary human capital among migrants to increase
labour adaptation and social integration. Also fiscal returns (taxes
and social welfare contributions) are estimated, which based on the
cost of the programme for each potential beneficiary could help fund
its cost totally or in part.
It is important to point out that for the assessment of salary
bonuses, it has been decided to start calculating benefits from the
lower threshold, i.e. salaries with low social welfare contributions
and moderate bonuses.*
GUILLEM LÓPEZ I CASASNOVAS
GABRIEL FERRAGUT
ANA MOSTERIN
CATIA NICODEMO
* At roughly 800 euros monthly, by current standards only four months of social welfare contri-
butions during the year after arriving – both factors have been empirically observed with groups
expected to be the beneficiaries of the programme – with an employee rate of two thirds on the
beneficiary population (except elderly, including existing unemployment and children attending
school till the age of 14).
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Cost and 
benefit of the
programme
The assessment of benefits is
based on those aspects in
which the Welcome Pro-
gramme has a larger impact::
Impact of basic linguistic
skills, as acknowledged by
the labour market and
reflected in the according
salary bonus. The bonus is
estimated empirically based
on the initial salaries result-
ing from this knowledge
and quantified out of
the minimum threshold
regarding data observed for
Spanish.
Knowledge of the environ-
ment, acknowledged as an
assimilation bonus reflected
in a salary increase, based
on the employee’s stay in
the country. Aspects such
as knowledge of the social
setting, labour market,
development of professional
contact networks and infor-
mation on access to public
services as potential users
are observed. This bonus is
calculated based on what is
stated now as a payment
increase after staying for a
given amount of years in the
country.
Improvement of social
capital in general, based on
benefits derived from other
social externalities. The aim
is to assess the economic
benefit created by the imple-
mentation of the programme
in order to prevent deterio-
ration of the social capital
and cohesion as factors con-
tributing to economic
growth. This is indirectly
quantified through informa-
tion available at the database
of the Instituto Valenciano de
Investigaciones Económicas
(IVIE) – Fundación BBVA.
Calculation of social
benefits
For the two first commented
effects (bonus for linguistic
skills and knowledge of the
environment) a model with
data from the Social Security
register has been created
based on the function of
human capital performance
(MINCER 1974),1 often used in
studies on salaries in the
migrant labour market:
LnYi = b0 + b1Si + b2Ti +
+ b3Ti
2 + b4(ADMi) + 
+ b5(ADMi)
2 + ei
ewhere LnYi is the natural
logarithm of the income from
work of the individual ‘i’; Si is
the extent of training of the
individual equivalent to full
school years; Ti contains the
cumulated labour experience
(in both the countries of ori-
gin and destination); and
ADMi is the number of years
of stay at the country of des-
tination since migration.
These last two variables
reflect the acquisition of skills
through formal and informal
training at work and by living
in the country of destination.2
Thus the acquisition of lin-
guistic skills can be considered
another way of cumulating
human capital, so the basic
equation of human capital
income can be extended to
include this item:3
LnYi = b0 + b1Si + b2Ti + 
+ b3Ti
2 + b4(ADMi) +
+ b5(ADMi)
2 + b6 LINGi + ei
where LINGi represents the
individual’s level of language
fluency and ei represents the
stochastic error.
The acquisition of
linguistic skills can be
considered another way
of cumulating human
capital.
With data from the Social
Security register it is possible
to analyse the influence on
remuneration of the insured
while keeping all the rest at
the same level: linguistic gap,
length of stay and sort of jobs
taken. The adjustment for
previous training of each
migrant’s human capital is
neutralised with the appro-
priate information from
the registry. This Mincerian
estimate (MINCER, 1974)
identifies the bonus of lin-
guistic skills (that for Spanish
would serve as a minimum
threshold as to Catalan,
which could be given an extra
bonus as it is the country’s
own language) and a perma-
nence bonus (learning social
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knowledge and adaptation)
in observed salaries.
To analyse the salary differ-
entiation process, a database
from the Muestra Continua de
Vidas Laborales (‘Continuous
Service Live Sample’, MCVL)
is used. This statistical source
results from random sam-
pling on 4% of the total pop-
ulation having had any kind
of relation with Spanish
Social Security between 2004
and 2006 (three first edi-
tions). These data have been
merged with those from the
Municipal Resident Registry,
in some cases even with the
Revenue Authority.
The aim of this is to examine
if individuals with a mother
tongue similar to the local
language of their country of
destination enter the labour
market with a higher salary
compared to those who
arguably are not in command
of the language, even if they
have the same personal pro-
file. To do so, we took as a
base for comparison individ-
uals from Africa and from
South America who are reg-
istered at the Social Security
and live in Catalonia or work
at a company registered with
the Social Security in Catalo-
nia, and having registered in
2004 for the first time. These
two groups are compared to
each other instead of using
the average Catalan popula-
tion as a benchmark since
there is a higher degree of
similitude in all except lin-
guistic skills (the former hav-
ing less command of the
language for social interac-
tion than the latter, who at
least speak Spanish).
The linguistic skill bonus
The sample includes 2113
South Americans and 1174
Africans. The declared aver-
age salary in the contribution
base of South Americans is
732 euros a month, whereas
that of Africans is 687 euros.
The monthly salary has been
calculated based on the con-
tributions paid by individuals
to the Social Security over
the year 2005.
The estimate shows that
there is a salary gap of 4.1%
between South Americans
and Africans, that is, South
Americans entering the
labour market knowing at
least one of the country’s
vehicular languages, being
newcomers and having the
same profile as Africans earn
a higher salary. Let us
remember that this is consid-
ered the minimum threshold
salary as the value of Catalan
as Catalonia’s own language
is likely to be assessed higher
than Spanish.
The part corresponding to
allocations is equal at -9%
(i.e. if Africans had the same
profile as South Americans,
they still would earn a lower
salary), while the discrimina-
tion effect, certainly due to
the difference in language, is
positive at 13%, which shows
that when Africans find their
first job in the labour market,
they earn a salary 13% under
that of South Americans. On
an average monthly salary of
€687, assuming that this
group pays social contribu-
tion four months a year in
average on this amount, and
being 66% of migrant popu-
lation, this would yield an
annual amount of €184 per
capita among Africans.
When Africans find their
first job in the labour
market, they earn a
salary 13% under that of
South Americans.
The assimilation bonus
The second item in the esti-
mate, which can also be cal-
culated based on MCVL data,
relates to examining the
remuneration bonus associ-
ated to the assimilation
process of these migrant
groups in the Catalan labour
market, which we called
«assimilation bonus» before.4
To study it, we created
another sample, made of
2348 South Americans and
2130 Africans contributing to
Spanish Social Security in
2001 for the first time and
having quit the Social Secu-
rity system after 2004, in
order to frame the learning
period. We find individuals
having had more than one
job over these years (they are
likely to have exited the
labour market at a given
point and then returned
later), thus having been in
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contact with the labour market
as a means of socialisation,
even if they worked only
twice in four years. The aver-
age initial monthly salary for
Africans and South Ameri-
cans is 839 and 875 euros,
respectively.
Using the same estimation
method as in the previous
case, it comes out that the
salary gap has increased by
3% with respect to the lan-
guage bonus estimate, being
now 7%. From this can be
inferred that after four years,
South Americans are better
positioned in the labour mar-
ket than Africans. Differenti-
ation is reduced, as it is 9%
now, and so is the difference
between features of both
groups (-2%), though it is
still negative.
In order to find a specific
value of the growth rate in
one same group based on its
initial salary (and not a dif-
ferential between groups), we
did the following:
Africans with Africans.
We have selected African
migrants who registered at
the Social Security in 2004 for
the first time. Thus we have a
sample of 1174 Africans con-
tributing in 2005, that is, they
entered the labour market in
that year. Now we take the
other sample, made of
Africans who contributed to
Spanish Social Security in
2001 for the first time and
having quit after 2004, that is,
they have been in the labour
market for at least four years.
Then we apply the model
again, always adjusted by the
same vector of features in
order to neutralise other dif-
ferences than those due to
the time differential (the vari-
able we are using as an
approach to the assimilation
bonus), and it comes out that
the salary gap between
Africans having been in the
labour market for four years
and those having contributed
during one year only is
24.5%. Of these 24.5%, 15%
amount to the advantages
obtained for having stayed
these years in terms of more
capacity, which the first
group has not yet (expertise,
language, education, etc.) and
which is the object of the
programme.
South Americans with
South Americans. In order
to assess the differential in
percentage rates, we selected,
in a similar way as before,
South Americans who regis-
tered at the Social Security in
2004 for the first time. We
thus obtained a sample of
2113 South Americans who
contributed to the Social
Security in 2005, that is, those
who entered the labour market
more recently. Applying the
same procedure as with
the previous group, we obtain
a salary gap of 27.8% between
South Americans having
been in the labour market for
four years and those having
contributed during one year
only. Of these 27.8%, 11.5%
amount to the different fea-
tures within the group, prob-
ably due to the bigger
capacities developed in these
years than the first group.
The analysis of salary
improvement
associated to the
assimilation process
shows that after four
years, South
Americans are better
positioned in the
labour market than
Africans.
Overall, these results move
between 11.5% in the case of
South Americans (for them,
the time-related assimilation
gain in knowledge of the
environment is not that high)
and 15% for Africans. Thus
any action based on the pro-
gramme accelerating this
knowledge would produce an
average yearly performance
between slightly more than
2.9% and 3.75%. The impact
we supposed to be exhausted
after four years is likely not to
be lineal, but we will assume
it as there are no other
founded hypotheses.
It turns out by chance that
the four-year assimilation
bonus is equivalent to that
of linguistic skills (a rough
 average 13% in both cases).
Taking the mean figure of
13% for all four years, it
would add a quarter of the
previous figure (€46 per year)
to the comparison. The total
sum of both bonuses thus
yields an income differential
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of €230 yearly, which for the
social welfare contribution
rate at 24% due to a higher
income would lead to addi-
tional Social Security revenue
of €55 per year. Compared to
the estimate programme cost
of €865 per person yearly,
amortisation would be close
to 15 years. As has been
commented before, any
implementation incidence in
a higher group (employment
induction) or consideration of
a calculation base for contri-
bution of groups with a
higher potential initial
income (South Americans)
would change the above-
mentioned figures.
Estimate by indirect 
metrics
Although we cannot repro-
duce the calculations of the
effect of linguistic skills or
years of stay on the income
of migrants due to a lack of
salary data in the registry, we
are able to analyse the effects
of the length of stay on the
likeliness of finding a job (or
a place to study) as a first
approach. We have been
working with data on Catalo-
nia from an anonymous 5%
sample of the 2001 census by
the Spanish National Insti-
tute of Statistics (INE) within
the age group between 16
and 65, considering those
studying or working vs. inac-
tive ones (household), pen-
sioners or unemployed. We
took off the sample those
receiving invalidity
allowance. Based on this,
employment grows at an
annual 5.7% in the first three
years after arrival.
Investment in the
Programme for Labour
Guidance and knowledge
of Catalan society can
lead to an employment
increase of 5.6%.
According to the available data
on the effect of the stay on the
employment level of migrants
in the 1999-2001 period – in
the registry sample for Catalo-
nia, and assuming that the
Programme for Labour Guid-
ance and knowledge of Catalan
society provides effective
knowledge and expertise
equivalent to one year stay in
Catalonia – investment in this
area can lead to an employ-
ment increase of 5.6% in the
near future. Of course, one
part of this effect intertwines
with the benefit from learning
the language.
In any case, the differential in
men as compared to natives
related to employment likeli-
ness of non-EU migrants is
17% (Africans are below
average at 10%), always
between comparable individu-
als. Hence no general initial
linguistic skill bonus is
detected. However, the com-
position by age and gender
still could explain the differ-
ence (the less familiar
regroupment, the higher
average employment among
this group). 
In the case of women, the
opposite applies. Latino
women feature a 10-point
differential instead of 16
points, which is the overall
average compared to natives.
Assimilation reduces the
average differential from
 seventeen to three points
within five years, and the most
significant reduction takes
place during the first year
of residence: within one
year, the differential goes
down from seventeen to six
percentage points, so any
effect of the programme in
the first year yields a very
high profitability. Also, the
opportunity cost of non-exis-
tence of the programme is
likely to be much lower if
does not affect the first year.
Assimilation reduces
the average
differential from
seventeen to three
points within five
years among Latino
women. The most
significant reduction
takes place during the
first year. Any effect of
the programme in the
first year yields a very
high profitability.
Indeed, analyses show that
the two first years are decisive
to close the gap. In this respect,
Africans are those with the
lowest assimilation rate – after
five years, they still maintain
a 5-point differential – and
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it can be said that variation in
skills is the point explaining
this. As to migrant women,
their employment level after
five years is eventually
higher in the case of Latino
ones, though within quite a
low employment range, as
we will see. This is not the
case of African women, who
keep a differential as high as
African men. Difference in
skills, rather than the linguis-
tic skill bonus and that of
knowledge of the country,
by this order, may be the
cause.
African women 
should be the prime
objective of the
Welcome Programme
based on achievable
benefits.
Related to the sort of job,
adjusted by characterisation
of individuals, the salary
range in which migrants are
featured as a whole (gener-
ally speaking, all) is lower
than with natives (40% of
migrants concentrate on the
five worst paid jobs). But
mobility reached with time
(five years) among Latinos
is quite high. The reason
cannot be the language here
(they already speak it) but
social interaction; this is not
the case of African migrants,
who are less mobile, espe-
cially women, for which
even no change of range is
stated. So it seems that
African women should be
the prime objective of the
Welcome Programme based
on achievable benefits.
Social capital
Based on the first calculation,
an approach is made to the
most intangible, less market-
driven benefits, which are
also an effect of the Wel-
come Programme and crys-
tallise in higher cohesion
(social capital). They can be
assessed, among others,
by means of cost reduction
of social emergency pro-
grammes and  non-contri -
butory benefit payments at
local level5 or by reducing
other correctional action
to maintain acceptable
inequality levels in the light
of emerged social difference.
The guiding principle in cal-
culating a shadow value that
reflects improvement of
social cohesion and social
capital, attributable to the
estimated welcome scheme,
takes the arrangement of
social capital indices devel-
oped the IVIE – BBVA Foun-
dation as a base, in both a
temporary and a transversal
series (by provinces in Spain
and by OECD countries).
The value of social
capital increases when
the GDP per capita of a
province grows, while it
decreases when the
foreign population rate
as of total population is
higher.
This allows to do regressions
against relative variation,
preferably of migration flows
(in our case of migrant popu-
lation) in the social fabric
(rate of the structure of
natives as of newly arrived
migrants), controlled by the
income increase in order to
isolate the effect of a variable
on the other. Specifically, the
model we regarded, based
on its higher explanatory
capacity and the significance
of its regressors, does a lineal
regression through minimal
ordinary squares. In this
regression, the value of social
capital services (metrics of
the volume of productive
social capital) in different
provinces is the dependent
variable and the proportion
of migrants on their total
population and GDP per
capita are the explanatory or
independent variables for
2001. This is the last year
with available information
to work out this index.
Both in the simple regression
as in that done on the loga-
rithmic transformation of
variables, the latter show
how the value of social capi-
tal increases when the GDP
per capita of a province
grows, while it decreases
when the foreign population
rate as of total population is
higher. Specifically, it is
observed that when this pro-
portion increases by 1%, the
value of social capital services
goes down 0.055%. From this
result we can derive the eco-
nomic benefit to be gener-
ated by implementing a
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Welcome Programme that
reduces relative deterioration
of social capital and cohe-
sion. For the evolution of the
structure of the Catalan
popu lation for the following
years, we formulate the
hypothesis that beneficiaries
of services rendered by the
Migration Act do not cause
deterioration as we estimated
it in terms of social capital
depreciation. The volume of
Welcome Programme benefi-
ciaries related to the migrant
inflow6 ranges between
41.67% in 2009 and 45.30%
in 2015.
To know the additional rev-
enue this income increase
may generate, we have to use
an indicator of tax collection
elasticity. In a survey by J.L.
Raymond and M. González-
Páramo (1988) – which
despite not being very recent
is one of the most complete
studies on tax collection
 elasticity in Spain, given the
long time series analysed
(1955-86) – the elasticity of
tax collection based on GDP
is estimated at 1.125. The
regression includes other
explanatory variables such as
collection in previous years,
GDP of previous years or
deficit of Spanish public
authorities. In another study
(LÓPEZ CASASNOVAS and
CASTELLANOS, 2005) a more
simple calculation is made,
however with updated data
on Catalonia (1986-2001), in
which an elasticity of 1.208 is
estimated, quite close to the
above-mentioned and which
we will use for our case as it
is more recent, according to
the following calculation:
Δ%Tt = εPIB,t × Δ%PIBt
To know the additional
revenue this income
increase may
generate, we have
to use an indicator 
of tax collection
elasticity.
Main results
According to the assump-
tions made in doing the
 previous calculations, three
scenarios have been defined
based on the forecasts of
 economic development (GDP
growth, inflation and salary
income growth) and the
influence of the impact on
labour market conditions:
conservative, moderately
favourable and favourable.
In any case, the expected
social effects and the
resources the public sector
can raise to fund this pro-
gramme can be made out:
Effects from implementing
the Welcome Programme
that will have a direct impact
in the shape of additional
benefits or salary income
(higher remuneration
from higher productivity)
earned by potential benefici-
aries of the programme
(workers entering the labour
market) as well as an indirect
impact on economic growth
attributable to potential im -
prove ment of social cohesion.
The increase of tax collection
by different administrations
from higher taxation of these
new workers based on salary
increases and inclusion
of initially inactive population
into the labour market.
Charts 1, 2 and 3 show a
summary of aggregated
results. (See next page)
Chart 4 shows a summary of
costs expected from imple-
menting the programme. (See
next page)
Comments to observed
results
A significant part of the pro-
gramme cost (up to 30%) is
recovered by the public sector
through higher tax collection
(income tax and social welfare
contributions as well as other
taxes based on economic
growth and the component
related to social capital
improvement), while calcu-
lated social benefits amount
to up to 70% of the pro-
gramme cost.
The resulting net value (social
benefits or additional tax rev-
enue less programme imple-
mentation cost) should also
include knowledge of Catalan
as an additional bonus to that
for Spanish. In this case, a
higher social rating is observed,
but it is difficult to identify
and quantify it in economic
terms. Just to illustrate it, if
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Chart 1. Benefits associated to the Migration Act. Conservative scenario
Source: Own
It is estimated that two thirds of potential programme users will be able to earn the calculated salary
bonuses upon entering the labour market.
Chart 2. Benefits associated to the Migration Act. Moderately favourable scenario (I)
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Chart 2. Benefits associated to the Migration Act. Moderately favourable scenario (II)
Source: Own
Source: Own
A 5.6% increase above the reference employment figure and a 1% increase above inflation of the
average salary index is expected.
A 1% increase above inflation of the average salary index is expected.
Chart 3. Benefits associated to the Migration Act. Favourable scenario
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we considered a 10% plus on
the above-mentioned
bonuses, it would mean an
additional benefit increasing
the language bonus position
by around 5% in each of the
three scenarios.
However, it is necessary to
point out what can be consid-
ered the combined effect of
the different positive factors the
programme cannot create, not
only with the inclusion of
more taxpayers into the
labour market but also in
the effectiveness of the pro-
gramme scope above the
regarded metrics. Some eco-
nomic effects encouraging the
reduction of the gap between
public and social revenue and
cost that are most likely to
occur are a higher tax basis as
workers would leave the black
market, more normalised
 taxation as to effective
migrant rate on the total
popu lation, etc. Additional
revenue from indirect local
taxation (general and specific
consumption, property, savings,
remittances, etc.) associated
to increased income for bene-
ficiaries is another part to it.
As to the overall effect on
economic growth, our analysis
has only done a plausible
 calculation of benefits from
economic improvement of
integration for the social capi-
tal, according to tax collection
elasticity (effect calculated
according to IVIE data, not
those of beneficiaries, which
we suppose are subject to
lower taxation), but not for
the rest. This option might be
more challengeable, besides
eroding the credibility of all
the assessment done, as some
might consider it.
The additional effect of job
creation linked to the action of
the programme itself, either
directly or induced by delivering
some services to be developed
in the programme externally,
could be considered in a simi-
lar way. This impact has not
been calculated here under
normal labour market condi-
tions given its distributive
transfer character. From a
social assessment perspective,
this assessment is to be com-
pleted with global benefits
(positive externalities) for the
whole community, that is, indi-
rect benefits for relatives of
programme users in the shape
of higher welfare (higher
employ ment and higher remu-
neration for assets also means
a better living standard for
taxpayers: human capital paying
more and better attention to
education of their children,
more care of the social envi-
ronment against exclusion of
worse-off people, etc.). Addi-
tionally, the benefit for the rest
of the society could be assessed
in terms of all those factors
not considered in the social
capital indicators used by the
IVIE methodology, like reduced
precarious labour, less need
for public and private action in
social emergency situations, etc.
If these factors were given a
shadow value equivalent to
14.5% of the rest of benefits
from the onset – though
decreasing considerably in
the following years till they
reach about 40% from the
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Chart 4. Summary of expected costs
Source: Secretariat of Migration, Department of Social Action and Citizenship, Government of Catalonia
A significant part of the programme cost is recovered by the public sector.
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fourth period onwards – the
programme would reach its
net positive value level. This
relative amount seems quite
reasonable given the impor-
tance and the multiplying
effect of not calculated external-
ities, as we already mentioned,
particularly in a context of
strong impact on the social
and cultural fabric created by
such a strong migration wave
like the one experienced
in Catalonia in the last
decade, in which political
action with a true social
welcome programme has
been absent.
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Notes
1. It seems to be very likely that the variable on the length of stay in the country of destination has a different effect, additional to acquisition
of linguistic capital and knowledge of the medium.
2. These two terms are included in the box as economic theory and previous empirical studies have proven that the income rise decreases in
the labour market and in the destination over the years. Cf. BEN-PORATH 1967, MINCER 1974, CHISWICK 1978.
3. Cf. MCMANUS et al. (1981); TAINER (1988); CHISWICK (1991; CHISWICK i MILLER (1992, 1995, 1998).
4. The programme, for instance, provides for 10-12 hours of overall labour knowledge (rights, making a CV, how is a contract, etc.), a visit to
the Employment Service of Catalonia (SOC), personal attention and registration as job applicant. This can have a big impact as most of re-
cent migration is family-based (in 2007, 53,000 authorisations for family regroupment were given in Catalonia, as opposed to 35,000 working
permits given). Much of this population believes that they cannot work (the permit says «permit of residence without authorisation to work»)
though they can do it if they go through a relatively simple procedure at the Government delegation and have a job offer. The effect on this
increase of the activity rate, especially with young and women, can be quite relevant based on the current economic situation. In June,
roughly 80,000 regrouped relatives were counted in the province of Barcelona, of which 5000 were older than 65 and 25,000 under 6; from
the remaining 50,000, only 1000 were registered at the Social Security, which shows the importance of the above-mentioned differential. As a
result, it is not that salaries in this subgroup can raise by 4% or 12%, but it is about having a salary where there is none today, though it is li-
kely that not all will eventually enter the labour market.
5. In cost accounting , the average use of social services by migrants in a sample of 50 municipalities in the province is known from available
information (usage statistics by the Barcelona Provincial Authority). By setting shadow prices, we know the potential reduction of marginali-
sation and crime the use of mechanisms for social cohesion may be causing.
6. In this case, we also consider that the average initial yearly volume observed for the 2001-2006 period is maintained (INE, Estadística de
Variaciones Residenciales, 2007).
7. GDP in constant values as the only variable explaining collection in constant values.
8. According to the initial forecast made in September 2008.
Reference
ABBOT, M.G.; BEACH, C.M. (1987). Immigrant Earning Differentials and Cohort Effects in Canada. Discussion paper núm. 705. Institute for Econo-
mic Research, Queen’s University. 
ALDÀS, J.; GOELRICH, F.; MAS, M. (2007). Consumo de los hogares y distribución de la renta en España (1973-2003). Una perspectiva regional. Funda-
ción Caixa Galicia.
ALEXANDER, M.A. (2007). «Determinants of Social Capital: New Evidence on Religion, Diversity and Structural Change». British Journal of Poli-
tical Science,  37: 2, p. 368-378.
AMUEDO-DORANTES, C.; DE LA RICA, S. (2007). «Labour Market Assimilation of Recent Immigrants in Spain». British Journal of Industrial Rela-
tions, 45:2, p. 257-284.
AMUEDO-DORANTES, C.; DE LA RICA S. (2007). Immigrants’ Responsiveness to Labor Market Conditions and their Impact on Regional Employment
Disparities: Evidence from Spain. FEDEA, discussion paper, 34.
BEN-PORATH, Y.(1967). «The Production of Human Capital and the Lifecycle of Earnings». Journal of Political Economy, 75, p. 352-365. 
BERMANE et al. (2000). Language-Skill Complimentarity: Returns to Immigrant Language Acquisition. Boston: Boston University.
BORJAS, G. J. (1995). «The Economic Benefits from Immigration». The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9: 2, p. 3-22. 
CASTELLANOS, A.; LÓPEZ CASASNOVAS, G. (2005). «El uso del análisis coste-beneficio en la estimacióin de la posibilidad de rescate de las auto-
pistas». Ekonomiaz, I: 60, p. 168-191.
CHEONG, P. H.; EDWARDS, R.; GOULBOURNE, H.; SOLOMOS, J. (2007). «Immigration, Social Cohesion and Social Capital: A Critical Review». Cri-
tical Social Policy, vol. 27, núm. 1, p. 24-49.
CHISWICK, B.R. (1991). «Speaking, Reading, and Earnings among Low-skilled Immigrants». Journal of Labor Economics, 9, p. 149-170.
CHISWICK , B.R.; MILLER, P. (1992). «Language in the Immigrant Labor Market». In: B.R.CHISWICK, (ed.). Immigration, Language and Ethnic Is-
sues: Canada and the United States. Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute, p. 229–296.
CHISWICK , B.R.; MILLER, P. (1988). «Earnings in Canada: The Roles of Immigrant Generation, French Ethnicity, and Language». Research in Po-
pulaiton Economics, 6, p. 183-224.
CHISWICK , B.R. (1978). «The Effect of Americanization on the Earnings of Foreign-born Men». Journal of Political Economy,  86: 5, p. 897-921.
CHISWICK , B.R.; MILLER, P.W. (1995). «The Endogeneity Between Language and Earnings: International Analyses». Journal of Labor Economics,
17, p. 151-200.
CHISWICK , B.R.; MILLER, P.W. (2007). The Economics of Language, International Analyses. Routledge Studies in the Modern World Economy. Lon-
dres: Routledge.
CHISWICK , B.R.; REPETTO, G. (2001). «Immigrant Adjustment in Israel: Literacy and Fluency in Hebrew and Earnings». In: DJAJIC, S. (ed.), Inter-
national Migration: Trends, Policy and Economic Impact. New York: Routledge, p. 204-228.
COLECTIVO IOÉ (1998). Trabajadores inmigrantes en el sector de la construcción. Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales, Instituto de
Migraciones y Servicios Sociales (IMSERSO).
CONDE-RUIZ, J.I.; GARCÍA, J.R.; NAVARRO, M. (2008). «Inmigración y crecimiento regional en España». Colección Estudios Económicos 09-08,
Serie Inmigración, CÁTEDRA Fedea – Grupo Banco Popular.
Miscellany254
A_242-256_Lo?pez_1.qxp:núm.2  25/6/09  09:43  Página 254
255paradigmes /  Issue no. 2 / June 2009
CONSEJO ECONÓMICOY SOCIAL (2004). Informe sobre la inmigración y el mercado de trabajo en España. Madrid: CES. 
CRETICOS, P.A.; SCHULZ J.M., BEEPER, A.; BALL, E. (2006). The Integration of Immigrants in the Workplace. Oak Park: Institute for Work and Eco-
nomy. 
DELEGACIÓN DEL GOBIERNO PARA LA EXTRANJERÍA Y LA INMIGRACIÓN. Anuario estadístico de extranjería 2000-2006. Observatorio
Permanente de la Inmigración. Available at: http:// www.mir.es/dgei.
DEVRIES, J.; VALLÉE, F.E. (1980). Language Use in Canada. Ottawa: Statistics Canada. 
DEVORETZ, D. (2006). «Immigration Policy: Methods of Economic Assessment». International Migration Review, 40:2.
DIPUTACIÓ DE BARCELONA (2007). Indicadors de gestió de serveis municipals. Guia d’interpretació. Resultats any 2006. Barcelona: Diputació
de Barcelona. 
EUROPEAN COMISSION DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR JUSTICE, FREEDOM AND SECURITY (2004). Handbook on Integration for Po-
licy-Makers and Practitioners. Brussels: European Commission.
FERNÁNDEZ-HUERTAS, J.; FERRER I CARBONELL, A. (2008). Immigration in Catalonia. Mimeo.
GENERALITAT DE CATALUNYA. Diverses ressenyes i estudis sobre usos lingüístics en l’àmbit econòmic. Secretaria de Política Lingüística
http://www.gencat.cat/presidencia/llengcat. Retrieved in February 2008.
GLAESER, E.; LAIBSON, D.; SACERDOTE, B. (2002). «An Economic Approach to Social Capital». Economic Journal, 112 (483, Nov), p. 437-458.
GRIN, F.; VAILLANCOURT, F. (1999). The Cost-effectiveness Policies: Case Studies on Wales, Ireland and the Basque Country. Flensburg: European
Centre for Minority Issues.
HUDSON, M.; PHILLIPS, J.; RAY, K.; BARNES, H. (2007). Social Cohesion in Diverse Communities. London: Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
IDESCAT (2006). Sondeig a la immigració. Estudi pilot sobre el perfil de la immigració marroquina, equatoriana, romanesa i xinesa instal·lada a Cata-
lunya. R. 357. Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya.
INE (on-line): Estadística de Variaciones Residenciales. Metodología. INEBASE, Web INE. Retrieved in February 2008.
INTERVENCIÓN GENERAL DEL ESTADO (2006). Avance de la actuación presupuestaria de las Administraciones Públicas. Madrid: Ministerio
de Economía y Hacienda.
IZQUIERDO A. (dir.) (2003). Inmigración: Mercado de trabajo y protección social en España. Madrid: Consejo Económico y Social, Colección Estudios.
IZQUIERDO, A. (dir.) (2006). Demografía de los extranjeros. Incidencia en el crecimiento de la población. Bilbao: Fundación BBVA.
IZQUIERDO M.; JIMENO, J.; ROJAS, J. (2007). On the Aggregate Efects of Immigration in Spain. Banco de España. Documentos de trabajo núm. 0714.
JEAN, S.; CAUSA, O.; JIMÉNEZ, M.; WANNER, I. (2007). «Migration in OECD Countries: Labour Market Impact and Integration Issues». OECD,
Economics Department Working Papers, 562.
JIMÉNEZ, J.C. (2006): La economía de la lengua: una visión de conjunto. Madrid: Documentos de Trabajo del ICEI-Fundación Telefónica.
LARIOS, M.J.; NADAL, M. (2007). L´estat de la immigració a Catalunya. Anuari 2006. Anàlisi jurídica i sociodemogràfica (Vol I). Recull estadístic i legis-
latiu (Vol II). Barcelona: Fundació Jaume Bofill.
LÓPEZ CASASNOVAS, G. (dir.) (2007). Inmigración y transformación social en Cataluña (Vol I). Aspectos socioeconómicos del fenómeno inmigratorio: las
cuestiones relevantes. Barcelona: Fundación BBVA and Institut d’Estudis Autonòmics. 
MARTIN, W.M.; LOMPERIS, A.E. (2002). «Determining the Cost Benefit, the Return on Investment, and the Intangible Impacts of Language
Programs for Development». TESOL Quarterly, 36: 3, p. 399-429(31).
MCMANUS, W.; GOULD, W.; WELCH, F. (1981). «Earnings of Hispanic Men: The Role of English Language Proficiency». Journal of Labor Econo-
mics, 1:101-0.
MINCER, J. (1974). Schooling, Experience and Earnings. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
MOTA, F. (2002). «El capital de las autonomías: ¿explica el capital social por qué unas comunidades autónomas funcionan mejor que otras? In:
SUBIRATS I HUMET, J.;  GALLEGO CALDERÓN, R. Veinte años de autonomías en España: leyes, políticas públicas, instituciones y opinión pública. Madrid:
Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, p. 293-320.
OLIVER J. (2006). España 2020, un mestizaje ineludible: cambio demográfico, mercado de trabajo e inmigración en las comunidades autónomas. Barcelo-
na: Generalitat de Catalunya / Institut d’Estudis Autonòmics.
ORTEGA, J. (2007). Determinantes del nivel de catalán de los inmigrantes en Cataluña: Un análisis de sección cruzada a nivel comarcal. FEDEA, Docu-
mento de Trabajo 2007-25.
PAJARES, M. (2007). Inmigración y mercado de trabajo informe 2007. Análisis de datos de España y Cataluña. Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo y Asun-
tos Sociales.
PASCUAL DE SANS, A. (dir.) (2007). Redes sociales de apoyo. La inserción de la población extranjera. Bilbao: Fundación BBVA.
MONTESINOS, V.; SERRANO, L.; FERNÁNDEZ DE GUEVARA, J.; PÉREZ, F. (2005). La medición del capital social: una aproximación económica. Bilbao:
Fundación BBVA.
PRUNÉS, A.; SOLÉ, J. (2002). «Usos, actituds i serveis lingüístics a les empreses associades a la CECOT». Noves SL.: Revista de sociolingüística, 3.
PUTNAM, R.D. (1993), Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
RAYMOND, J.L.; GONZÁLEZ-PÁRAMO, M. (1988). «Déficit, impuestos y crecimiento del gasto público». Papeles de Economía Española, 37.
ROCA, M. (2005). «Estudio de caso: el impacto de la inmigración en Guissona (Lleida)». In: LÓPEZ CASASNOVAS, G. (dir). Inmigración y transfor-
mación social en Cataluña (Vol I). Aspectos socioeconómicos del fenómeno inmigratorio: las cuestiones relevantes. Barcelona: Fundación BBVA and
Institut d’Estudis Autonòmics.
SECRETARIA DE POLÍTICA LINGÜÍSTICA DEL DEPARTAMENT DE LA PRESIDÈNCIA I L’IDESCAT (2004). Estadística d’usos lingüístics a
Catalunya 2003. Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya.
SECRETARIA PER A LA IMMIGRACIÓ (2005). Pla de Ciutadania i Immigració 2005-2008. Barcelona. Generalitat de Catalunya Departament
de Benestar i Família Secretaria per a la Immigració. 
TAINER, E. (1988). «English Language Proficiency and Earnings Among Foregin-Born Men». Journal of Human Resources, 23(1), p. 108-122.
VELTMAN, C.J. (1983). Language Shift in the United States. New York: Mouton.
ZETTER, R.; GRIFFITHS, D.; SIGONA, M. (2006). Immigration, Social Cohesion and Social Capital: What are the Links. New York: Joseph Rowntree
Foundation.
A_242-256_Lo?pez_1.qxp:núm.2  25/6/09  09:43  Página 255
pàg. 256
blanca
A_242-256_Lo?pez_1.qxp:núm.2  25/6/09  09:43  Página 256
